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final qbuf patch

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This is my final src mod to ensure that a qbuf does not overflow due to
a lengthy named object.  These recent patches, coupled with the core yn_function() patch earlier, should make it much rarer for a QBUFSZ
buffer overflow to occur in a window port routine (unless the window
port routine has its own bugs, but that isn't the core's fault).
This commit is contained in:
nethack.allison
2003-05-10 21:11:16 +00:00
parent 0f7508090d
commit 6f56da5261
3 changed files with 16 additions and 7 deletions
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7
src/trap.c
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* SCCS Id: @(#)trap.c 3.4 2003/04/30 */
/* SCCS Id: @(#)trap.c 3.4 2003/02/10 */
/* Copyright (c) Stichting Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam, 1985. */
/* NetHack may be freely redistributed. See license for details. */
@@ -1208,7 +1208,6 @@ struct trap *trap;
/* caller may subsequently fill pit, e.g. with a boulder */
trap->ttyp = PIT; /* explosion creates a pit */
trap->madeby_u = FALSE; /* resulting pit isn't yours */
seetrap(trap); /* and it isn't concealed */
}
#endif /* OVLB */
@@ -3378,7 +3377,9 @@ boolean force;
if(!u.dx && !u.dy) {
for(otmp = level.objects[x][y]; otmp; otmp = otmp->nexthere)
if(Is_box(otmp)) {
Sprintf(qbuf, "There is %s here. Check it for traps?", doname(otmp));
Sprintf(qbuf, "There is %s here. Check it for traps?",
safe_qbuf("", sizeof("There is here. Check it for traps?"),
doname(otmp), an(simple_typename(otmp->otyp)), "a box"));
switch (ynq(qbuf)) {
case 'q': return(0);
case 'n': continue;